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10.1 Introduction
The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries witnessed the birth of
the American regulatory state. During the Progressive Era, federal au-
thority over banking, insurance, transportation, competition, and inter-
state trade in food and drug products greatly expanded. Indeed, it is dur-
ing this period that the federal government began to displace state and
local governments as the primary source of regulation in the economy.
Government regulation became not only more federal, but more intrusive.
The question is why.
Broadly speaking, there are three views of the emergence of the federal
regulatory state.1 One is a public interest view that argues that federal reg-
ulation arose to solve market failures that state and local governments
could not address, and that Progressive Era reformers interested in im-
proving consumer welfare lobbied in favor of these regulations. While this
account is supported by a large historical literature, it fails to explain why
regulation, as opposed to the court system, was needed to safeguard con-
sumer welfare (Glaeser and Schleifer 2003). A second view is that regula-
tion was adopted to give a competitive advantage to business groups. This
regulatory capture argument is intuitively appealing, but it cannot account
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1. For an overview and synthesis of some of these views see Levine and Forrence (1990).for why there was so much contemporaneous popular support for regula-
tion. A third view emphasizes the role played by the muckraking press and
entrepreneurial bureaucrats in galvanizing public support for regulation.
The exact mechanisms by which these interests inﬂuenced the adoption of
regulation, however, have not been explored. While the ﬁrst view empha-
sizes the eﬃciency-improving role of regulation, the latter two suggest that
regulation may have had dubious eﬀects on consumer welfare.
In this chapter, we examine these three explanations for the adoption of
Progressive Era regulation through the lens of federal food and drug legis-
lation. In 1906 the federal government enacted the Pure Food and Drugs
Act, the ﬁrst federal law that gave regulators unprecedented authority over
interstate trade in food and drug products. The central issues we investigate
are the timing and nature of support for the food and drugs act. We also
explore the early enforcement of this law and its eﬀects on consumer wel-
fare. The passage of this act can reveal much about the entire Progres-
sive agenda and the establishment of the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA).2
We ﬁnd that aspects of all three views of regulation explain the adoption
of the Pure Food and Drugs Act, that producer, consumer, and bureau-
cratic interests maneuvered to mold the law to their beneﬁt, and that the
muckraking press inﬂuenced the timing of adoption. Both the legislative
history and statistical analysis underscore the desires of various producer
groups to tilt the competitive playing ﬁeld, of federal bureaucrats to ex-
pand their regulatory mandates, and of Progressive reform interests to en-
sure that consumers were not deceived about the quality of food and drugs
they purchased. Even so, while several pure food and drug bills were con-
sidered during the 1890s and early 1900s, none were passed. Conﬂict
among these competing interests made it impossible to form an enacting
political coalition. In 1905–6, however, with the publication of Upton Sin-
clair’s The Jungle along with sensational muckraking articles in leading
magazines and newspapers, popular opinion in favor of food and drug reg-
ulation was electriﬁed, and this in turn facilitated the formation of an eﬀec-
tive coalition in favor of ﬁnal passage of the law.
We also ﬁnd that because the interests behind the legislation were unable
to entirely shape the enforcing agency or the legal environment in which
enforcement took place, these groups did not ultimately beneﬁt from reg-
ulation as initially anticipated. Accordingly, while a combination of the
three views of regulation furnishes an explanation for why regulation arose
at the time that it did, it does not provide a complete account of the ulti-
mate eﬀect of policy. A more eclectic approach that takes into account the
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2. Until the late 1920s, the organization that we know today as the FDA was the Bureau of
Chemistry, an agency within the federal Department of Agriculture. In 1927 the regulatory
portion of this agency was renamed the Food, Drug and Insecticide Administration. In 1930
its name was shortened to the Food and Drug Administration.abilities of interest groups to inﬂuence the institutional environment is
needed to fully understand the causes and consequences of Progressive Era
regulation.
10.2 Market Changes and a Conceptual Framework 
for Analysis of Reform
Three important developments characterized the market for food and
drugs in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The ﬁrst was the
introduction of new and cheaper food and drug products that threatened
to erode the dominant position enjoyed by older products. These compet-
itive changes gave rise to trade wars among rival ﬁrms. The second was
scientiﬁc advances that increased the complexity of many products. This
situation created opportunities for cost-saving deception by some ﬁrms
through alteration or adulteration of their products in ways that con-
sumers could not easily perceive. Uncertainty about product quality, in
turn, placed consumers at risk of being cheated about quality or, more omi-
nously, of being poisoned. The third was the creation of national markets
that aﬀected consumers, producers, and government agencies. Increas-
ingly, consumers purchased food and drugs that were made in other states,
often outside the jurisdiction of local or state courts and regulatory bod-
ies. In disputes over product quality, individual state regulations and tort
actions were ineﬀective as remedies. Additionally, ﬁrms producing for the
national market were faced with diﬀerent and often conﬂicting regulatory
environments that made compliance and product standardization diﬃcult.
Growing interstate trade and general concerns about product safety there-
fore created new opportunities for federal regulators to extend their man-
dates. In contrast, state regulatory oﬃcials were often jealous of their pre-
rogatives and suspicious of any expansion of federal authority. All in all,
these developments in the market for food and drugs meant that the de-
mand for federal regulation during the Progressive Era could come from
three diﬀerent sources, described below.
10.2.1 Regulation as a Solution to Market Failure
Asymmetric information about product ingredients and product quality
created concerns that there was a “lemons” problem in the market for
many food and drug items (Akerlof 1970). Because consumers could not
detect many forms of food and drug adulteration, markets could not al-
ways guarantee the delivery of quality food and drug products (Darby and
Karni 1973; McCluskey 2000). Hence, there was a productive role for prod-
uct quality regulation by scientiﬁc experts, who had a comparative advan-
tage in judging the quality of food and drug items. Since national markets
were involved, federal politicians could improve consumer welfare and also
garner votes by adopting federal regulatory legislation. Under this view
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Act and its administering agency were a means of solving the problem; reg-
ulation was consumer driven and aimed at solving real economic problems.
10.2.2 Rent Seeking through Regulatory Capture
An alternative view based on the work of Kolko (1963), Stigler (1971),
and Peltzman (1976) highlights the role of regulation in advancing speciﬁc
producer interests rather than the eﬃciency gains from regulation. Firms
captured the regulatory process in order to raise the costs of their rivals
through constraints on entry or other production restrictions (Wood
1986). This action beneﬁted ﬁrms that sought to mitigate any advantages
their rivals gained from the adoption of new production technologies.
Politicians responded because these groups could oﬀer votes and cam-
paign contributions in exchange. At the state level, some laws were de-
signed to strategically advantage local and regional producers who faced
new interstate competitive pressures. More national producers and inter-
est groups, in contrast, sought federal legislation to create uniform regula-
tory standards, thwart more aggressive state regulation, and to disadvan-
tage other producers. If the regulations were eﬀective, successful producer
groups could secure monopoly rents through higher prices and reduced
output. Hence, under this view, the principal advocates of the legislation
were industry groups seeking competitive advantages relative to their ri-
vals. The Pure Food and Drugs Act was an example of the capture of gov-
ernment by business interests, and the Bureau of Chemistry and FDA
wereagents of that capture. The distributional gains secured by businessof-
fered no consumer beneﬁts. Indeed, by restricting entry, the law may have
harmed consumers.
10.2.3 Rent Seeking by Enterprising Federal Bureaucrats and the Press
A ﬁnal possibility emphasizes the roles played by entrepreneurial federal
bureaucrats seeking to expand their jurisdictions and agency budgets
(Niskanen 1971) and by muckraking journalists seeking to sell newspa-
pers, magazines, and books. These two parties formed a natural alliance in
favor of regulation because the press could publicize the self-serving “sci-
entiﬁc” concerns of federal regulators about food and drug safety. Muck-
raking publications could galvanize public support for regulation through
grisly tales about consumers being defrauded and even poisoned. Addi-
tionally, sensational muckraking disclosures attracted readers. These
claims were credible because new production technologies and products
were not well understood by consumers and their quality and health eﬀects
could not be easily assessed. If regulation were adopted by taking advan-
tage of limited consumer and voter information, it too would provide little
or no welfare gain for consumers. Accordingly, under this view, consumers
were manipulated by an aggressive press and federal bureaucracy seeking
322 Marc T. Law and Gary D. Libecapto exploit their ignorance of the content of new products and processes.
Enactment of the Pure Food and Drugs Act was a response less to real eco-
nomic problems than to rising consumer concerns fueled by a newly eﬀec-
tive, sensational media. The major proponents of the law then were con-
sumer groups, the muckraking press, and federal bureaucrats.
To see how each of these views performs in explaining the adoption of
federal regulation we turn to an examination of the market for food and
drugs in the late 1800s and the legislative history of federal food and drug
regulation.
10.3 Market Changes and the Legislative History of Federal Regulation
Regulation may have had multiple advocates with diﬀerent objectives.
The key constituencies potentially involved in food and drug regulation in-
clude ideologically motivated Progressive reformers, state regulators, fed-
eral regulators, incumbent ﬁrms producing “old” goods, entrant ﬁrms pro-
ducing “new” goods, the muckraking press, and consumers. These parties
had conﬂicting incentives for federal regulation of product quality. These
diﬀerences shaped political constituencies as well as the nature of the con-
ﬂict surrounding proposed pure food and drug bills.
10.3.1 The Changing Market and Producers’ Incentives 
to Lobby for Regulation
Expanding markets combined with advances in food processing gave
rise to new products that better met the needs of certain market segments
and were cheaper than those produced by older ﬁrms. These older ﬁrms
thus had an incentive to organize to obtain government support in block-
ing or limiting the spread of these new products.
Consider the following products and their impacts on the market. Oleo-
margarine, the ﬁrst viable butter substitute, was introduced to the Ameri-
can market in the early 1870s. Invented in 1869 by the French chemist
Mège-Mouries, oleomargarine (margarine) quickly became popular
among working-class households because it was considerably cheaper
than butter (Dupré 1999). Similarly, declining transportation costs and the
development of the refrigerated rail car made it possible for large meat
packinghouses located in Chicago, St. Louis, and other midwestern cities
to slaughter cattle centrally and ship prepared beef carcasses (known as
“dressed beef”) to eastern markets. By the 1880s, sales of dressed beef ri-
valed sales of locally slaughtered meat in New York, Boston, and other
cities on the east coast (Yeager 1981; Libecap 1992). Advances in chem-
istry gave rise to a new form of baking powder—alum-based baking pow-
der—that was cheaper than traditional cream of tartar baking powders.
Additionally, other improvements in canning and preserving technology
made it possible to expand both the geographical and temporal distances
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seafood.
As a consequence of these developments, conﬂicts among competing
factions of the food trade became common. Dairy producers, threatened
by the growing popularity of oleomargarine, slandered oleomargarine as
“the greasy counterfeit” and, importantly, sought regulations at the state
and federal level to stem the growth of the oleomargarine trade. Local
butchers, in concert with disgruntled cattlemen, charged that dressed beef
was unsafe and lobbied for meat inspection and antitrust to disadvantage
the large Chicago packinghouses. A long and protracted battle emerged
between the cream of tartar baking powder interests and the alum-based
baking powder interests, each of whom charged that the other product was
dangerous to health and attempted to obtain regulation that disadvan-
taged the other product. Similar conﬂicts also arose between “straight”
and “blended” whiskey producers, each claiming that the other product
was impure and unsafe for consumers. The arrival of newer, cheaper sub-
stitute products clearly stimulated a demand for regulation on the part of
certain producer groups who desired regulation as a way of shifting de-
mand away from competing products (Wood 1986, pp. 152–80).
Indeed, some of the laws regulating the food industry were closely tied to
the eﬀorts of industry groups to weaken their rivals. For instance, regula-
tions enacted by state governments that required oleomargarine to be col-
ored diﬀerently from butter, that prohibited the use of oleomargarine in
boarding houses, prisons, or in restaurants, or that tightly regulated or
even prohibited its sale were enacted primarily to beneﬁt dairy farmers.
Further, the 1886 Oleomargarine Tax enacted by Congress required oleo-
margarine producers to mark and stamp their product in various ways, im-
posed an internal revenue tax of $0.02 per pound on oleomargarine, and
levied a fee of $600 per year on oleomargarine producers, $480 per year on
oleomargarine wholesalers, and $48 per year on oleomargarine retailers
(U.S. Senate 1900–1901; Lee 1973; Dupré 1999).
Correspondingly, the 1891 Meat Inspection Act was enacted in part to
satisfy a coalition of cattlemen and local butchers in eastern markets, who
wanted regulation that would stem the growth of the dressed meat trade
and disadvantage the large Chicago packers. The large packers, however,
also supported the law because it helped to create foreign markets for their
meats by requiring inspection of cattle and hogs destined for interstate and
foreign commerce (Libecap 1992).
10.3.2 The Changing Market and Consumers’ Incentives 
to Secure Regulation
Consumers also had reasons to be worried about changes in the market
for food and drugs. As food production moved out of households and into
impersonal markets, and as foods became more sophisticated as a result of
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for ordinary consumers to discern product quality and composition. Fears
about the quality of food products—speciﬁcally about the ingredients con-
tained in foods, as well as in the nutritional value of foods containing chem-
icals, preservatives, and other manufactured components—began to be ex-
pressed by chemists, home economists, public health oﬃcials, and other
reform-minded individuals. These parties expressed their concern for con-
sumer welfare by highlighting the potential problems and by calling for a
more active role for government.
For instance, there was a burgeoning literature on how food was “adul-
terated” (i.e., cheapened through the addition of impurities) by manufac-
turers and distributors in an eﬀort to obtain dear prices for cheap items,
and on the consequences of food adulteration for health and longevity.
“We buy everything, and have no idea of the processes by which articles are
produced, and have no means of knowing beforehand what the quality
may be,” wrote Ellen Richards, one of the leaders of the home economics
movement, in her 1885 book entitled Food Materials and Their Adulter-
ation. “Relatively we are in a state of barbarous innocence, as compared
to our grandmothers, about the common articles of daily use” (quoted in
Strasser 1989, p. 255). Asymmetric information about food ingredients
thus gave rise to the perception that there was a lemons problem in the mar-
kets for many food and drug items.
State and federal agencies were attracted to the issue, and studies con-
ducted by analytical chemists employed in state and federal public health
and agricultural departments revealed extensive food adulteration. Ac-
cording to a 1902 Senate Report that surveyed the ﬁndings of several adul-
teration studies conducted during the prior two decades, food adulteration
was reasonably common (U.S. Senate 1902). Numerous independent stud-
ies found that milk was watered down or skimmed without warning. Oth-
ers found butter to be cheapened by the addition of oleomargarine. Cot-
tonseed oil was often added to lard that was marketed as “pure leaf lard.”
Glucose and chemical preservatives were frequently added to canned and
prepared goods without indication on product labels. Many of these ac-
tions were documented in 1887 in Food Adulteration and Its Detection by
J. P.  Battershall, a chemist employed by the U.S. Public Health Depart-
ment.
Claims were also made by advocates of regulation that adulterated food
posed health risks, but the available evidence was more mixed, perhaps be-
cause understanding about the basics of human nutrition was very primi-
tive at the time, even among leading physicians and public health oﬃcials.
In testimony to congressional hearings on food adulteration in the late
1890s and early 1900s, physicians and scientists disagreed about the nutri-
tional value of preservatives like borax and salicylic acid, about the eﬀects
on human digestion of alum-based as opposed to cream of tartar–based
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tion of artiﬁcial sweeteners like glucose (U.S. Senate 1899–1900; Young
1989, pp. 140–45).
Charges that particular food products were poisonous and could lead to
death were largely unsupported, since there was little evidence of wide-
spread poisonings resulting from the consumption of dressed beef, canned
fruits, vegetables, and meats, or other manufactured and processed food
items.3 Much of the scientiﬁc debate involved government oﬃcials, and it
centered on the more subtle consequences of food consumption on diges-
tion and nutrition.
Reputation mechanisms may have been a market solution for reducing
consumer uncertainty about food quality. Product branding proliferated as
producers of canned and processed foods like Swift, the National Biscuit
Company, and H. J. Heinz worked to establish reputations for providing
high-quality products (Strasser 1989). Retail grocery chains like A&P and
Kroger also emerged in the late 1800s, partly in response to the need to as-
sure consumers of the quality of foodstuﬀs (Kim 2001).
In general, however, it was diﬃcult for consumers to know if the foods
they ate were harmful or healthful, or if chemical preservatives or low-
quality ingredients had been added to their food. Hence, market-based so-
lutions to the asymmetric information problem, which relied on ex post
veriﬁability of product quality, likely were insuﬃcient to guarantee the de-
livery of those dimensions of quality that had “credence” characteristics
(Darby and Karni 1973; McCluskey 2000). This sentiment was expressed
by a member of the Forty-Ninth Congress (1885), who made the following
argument in a speech to the House on the need for pure food regulation:
In ordinary cases the consumer may be left to his own intelligence to pro-
tect himself against impositions. By the exercise of a reasonable degree
of caution, he can protect himself from frauds in under-weight and in
under-measure. If he can not detect a paper-soled shoe on inspection, he
detects it in the wearing of it, and in one way or another he can impose
a penalty upon the fraudulent vendor. As a general rule the doctrine of
laissez faire can be applied. Not so with many of the adulterations of
food. Scientiﬁc inspection is needed to detect the fraud, and scientiﬁc in-
spection is beyond the reach of the ordinary consumer. In such cases
the Government should intervene. (Congressional Record 1885, pp.
5040–41)
Concerns about food quality generated demand for food regulation
among advocates for consumers. Progressive reform groups—most no-
tably women’s groups like the General Federation of Women’s Clubs
(GFWC), the Women’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU), as well as
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3. Olmstead and Rhode (2004) report a more direct growing human health threat through
bovine tuberculosis. Federal regulatory responses began in 1913.leaders of the home economics movement and public health oﬃcials—lob-
bied for regulations that banned the sale of adulterated and misbranded
food products.
Accordingly, some of the food regulations enacted during the Progres-
sive Era appear to have had clear public interest motivations. In particular,
the general pure food and dairy laws enacted by state governments during
the last two decades of the nineteenth century were aimed at improving the
accuracy of product labels. While the content and form of these laws var-
ied somewhat from state to state, in general the goal of these regulations
was to ensure that mixtures and impurities that were added to products be
indicated clearly on product labels. In so doing, these state pure food laws
helped solve a lemons problem in the market for many food products. This
action beneﬁted certain consumers, who desired better information about
product quality, as well as higher-quality producers, who felt that regula-
tion would help them segment the market for their wares (Law 2003).
10.3.3 Market Changes and Government Oﬃcials’ Incentives 
to Secure Regulation
Eﬀorts to expand regulation provided opportunities for state and federal
bureaucracies to increase their budgets, staﬃng, and authority. Regulation
by “experts” made sense to advocates because chemists and other scien-
tists employed in government agencies had a deﬁnite comparative advan-
tage over consumers in detecting food adulteration. Indeed, during the
1880s and 1890s, most state governments enacted “pure food” and “pure
dairy” laws that outlawed the sale of adulterated foods and that gave oﬃ-
cials employed in state pure food agencies the authority to seize adulter-
ated and misbranded products and prosecute manufacturers and dealers
who violated these regulations (U.S. Senate 1900–1901).
By the 1890s, however, it became clear that state governments were not
optimally positioned to systematically regulate the content of food labels.
This was for three reasons. First, the expansion of interstate trade in food
products made it increasingly diﬃcult for state governments to regulate
goods produced out of state or even enforce their own pure food laws. Al-
though state governments had the authority to regulate goods produced
and sold within their borders, they had no authority over the production of
goods in other states and could not control the sale of out-of-state goods
sold within their boundaries. By shipping goods in an “original and un-
broken package,” out-of-state manufacturers and distributors could cir-
cumvent a state’s pure food regulations (U.S. Senate 1899–1900, pp. 529–
30).
Second, the pure food laws enacted in many states were often not en-
forced. Although nearly every state enacted a pure food law between 1880
and 1900, only half of these state laws entrusted enforcement to a particu-
lar state agency (Law 2003). The pure food laws enacted by the remaining
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evidence presented by Goodwin (1999, pp. 68–70) suggests that enforce-
ment was limited or even nonexistent in those states that did not have an
enforcement agency. While there is some evidence that lax enforcement in
some states may have been in response to pressure from particular food
manufacturers (Okun 1986), a close examination of congressional testi-
mony on proposed food and drug bills and other contemporary sources
does not suggest that “corruption” of state regulators by industry interests
played a systematic role in undermining state eﬀorts. Regulation was lax in
many states not because manufacturers deliberately made it so but rather
because government in general was small and budgets were limited. As a
result, pure food regulations in many states did little to solve the asymmet-
ric information problem regarding product ingredients.
Finally, in testimony to Congress, manufacturers and distributors en-
gaged in interstate trade in foodstuﬀs also complained that compliance
with several diﬀerent state regulations was costly. These manufacturers and
distributors desired a uniform federal pure food law because they felt that
it would reduce compliance costs and because a national law might pre-
empt more onerous state regulation. For instance, according to the direc-
tor of a large Chicago wholesaler,
The various states throughout this country . . . have passed pure-food
laws, and in the distribution of merchandise—some kinds of merchan-
dise—I ﬁnd that at times errors are very likely to crop up in the shipping
of goods in these states on account of the lack of uniformity, as the law
of one State diﬀers from the law of another, so that for the last ten years
the merchants and manufacturers of Chicago have been clamoring for a
national pure-food law, in the same manner that we clamored for a na-
tional bankruptcy act. It requires a lawyer for each State to know what
the requirements are in each state in order to know the rules that prevail
in them. (U.S. Senate 1899–1900, p. 73)
As the push for federal regulation intensiﬁed, however, conﬂict arose
among bureaucrats at the federal and state level regarding who should en-
force a federal pure food law and who should have authority to set food
standards. Beginning in 1887, the Bureau of Chemistry, an agency within
the Department of Agriculture, began to publish several high-proﬁle stud-
ies documenting the nature and extent of food adulteration in the United
States. Under the leadership of Dr. Harvey Wiley, the Bureau of Chemistry
began to develop a reputation for its analysis of food adulteration in Amer-
ica. By the mid-1890s it became clear that the Bureau of Chemistry would
become the agency responsible for enforcing a federal pure food and drugs
law.
Federal oﬃcials within the Bureau of Chemistry faced a strong incentive
to lobby for federal pure food regulation since they would capture the ben-
eﬁts of regulation through an expansion of their regulatory mandate. Reg-
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the potential to make them redundant, but also because they were suspi-
cious that federal regulators (speciﬁcally, Harvey Wiley) would not be in-
dependent of certain manufacturing interests with whom Wiley had ties.
On the other hand, the Association of Oﬃcial Agricultural Chemists
(AOAC) as well as regulators from other states were solidly behind Harvey
Wiley and the Bureau of Chemistry. Jockeying among bureaucratic inter-
est groups thus also contributed to political stalemate over regulatory re-
form (Coppin and High 1999).
10.3.4 Political Stalemate and the Muckraking Press 
in the Timing of Regulation
The conﬂicting objectives of business, consumer, and state and federal
government interests created a political stalemate and blocked action at
the federal level for food and drug regulation. Consider for example, the
Paddock Bill, introduced in 1890 by Senator Paddock of Nebraska to pro-
tect producers and consumers against commercial fraud in food products
(adulteration) and to improve the reputation of American food products
abroad and thereby promote exports. Despite claims of widespread sup-
port for the bill from citizens, state legislatures, wholesale grocery and drug
associations, boards of trade, and farm organizations, no action was taken
in 1890 or 1891. Corn and hog producers, who were waging a trade war
against adulterated lard that had cottonseed oil added to it, were strong ad-
vocates, and in 1892 the bill was reintroduced to the Senate in a weakened
form. It passed the Senate, but in the House cottonseed oil producers,
through their congressional representatives, were able to prevent it from
becoming law (Anderson 1958, pp. 78–80; Young 1989, pp. 97–99).
Similarly, competing baking powder interests stalled other federal pure
food bills. In these cases, producers of cream of tartar baking powders
wanted the regulations to be written in a way that put alum-based baking
powders at a competitive disadvantage. Naturally, producers of alum-
based baking powders wanted assurances that the regulations would not be
enforced in a way that discriminated against their product. Hence, accord-
ing to Anderson (1958, p. 135), by 1900 “the situation had reached a point
where, no matter how the bill was phrased, it would encounter opposition
from either of the two great camps of baking powder producers.”
Additionally, conﬂict among straight and blended whiskey producers
contributed to political gridlock over eﬀorts to secure a pure food law in
the early 1900s. Straight (distilled) whiskeys, produced in Kentucky, Mary-
land, Virginia, and Pennsylvania, competed with cheaper “blended” (rec-
tiﬁed) whiskeys, produced in Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio. Straight whiskey
interests, who were the incumbent producers, viewed blended whiskeys as
impure products and sought regulation that would disadvantage blended
whiskies, which were rapidly gaining market share. Pure food bills were
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blends” (blended whiskey) be “labeled, branded, or tagged, so as to show
the character and constituents thereof.”4 Concerned that this clause would
force blended whiskey manufacturers to disclose valuable trade secrets, the
National Wholesale Liquor Dealers’ Association, the trade organization
of blended whiskey producers, organized successfully to ﬁght these bills
(Young 1989, pp. 165–68).
Finally, disagreement over whether pure food regulation should include
medicines—in particular, drugs that were not listed in the United States
Pharmacopoeia (USP) or the National Formulary (NF)—also generated
political opposition to federal regulation. Selected progressive reform
groups, in particular women from the WCTU, wanted patent medicines
and proprietary nostrums to be regulated because of their alcohol content.
Organized medicine, represented by the American Medical Association
(AMA), also desired regulations that limited the availability of “quack”
drugs (Anderson 1958, pp. 169–71). The AMA was motivated in part be-
cause of the health risks posed by patent medicines, but also because, by
functioning as a substitute for physicians’ services, patent medicines were
a competitive threat to physicians.
The trade organizations for patent medicines, the Proprietary Associa-
tion, and other drug producers, as well as newspapers that were dependent
on patent medicine advertising as a source of revenues, lobbied against
proposed pure food and drug regulations that would include drugs not
listed in either the USP or the NF.5 They feared that the federal govern-
ment would begin to regulate the therapeutic claims made about their
products. According to the Proprietary Association’s Committee on Leg-
islation, regulation that deﬁned drugs more broadly “would practically
destroy the sale of proprietary remedies in the United States” (quoted in
Young 1989, p. 169).
These legislative conﬂicts might have eﬀectively prevented adoption of
any federal law had it not been for the rise of muckraking journalism and
its sensational claims that raised the political costs of opposing regulation.
Indeed, muckraking journalism, by making the issue of food and drug
adulteration emotionally salient, served as a coordinating device through
which diﬀuse consumer interests were harnessed.
Several factors contributed to the appearance of muckraking journalism
in the late 1800s, and these factors were closely tied to the undercurrents of
Progressive reform more broadly and to food and drug regulation more
speciﬁcally. Many Progressive reformers were writers and journalists, who
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4. According to Young (1989, p. 167), Wiley “abominated” blended whiskey and “leagued
with the distillers to plot ways of checkmating the blenders’ stratagems.”
5. Patent medicines were in fact among the most important sources of newspaper and
magazine advertising revenues during this period. See Young (1967).believed in the “power of the pen” to inform readers of social and eco-
nomic problems and to persuade ordinary citizens of the need for reform
(Hays 1957). Further, technological and organizational developments
made it possible for these writers and journalists to reach a larger audience
than ever before. The adoption of high-speed presses and the perfection of
halftone photoengraving reduced production costs and improved the qual-
ity of illustrations. Declining postal rates during the 1880s and 1890s low-
ered the cost of distributing periodicals throughout the nation. The growth
of a national market for consumer products and the sale of magazine and
periodical space to national advertising companies made it possible for pe-
riodicals to be sold to consumers at extremely low prices (often less than
ten cents per copy). Owners of periodicals like McClure’s, Cosmopolitan,
Colliers Weekly, Everybody’s, and Munsey’s soon discovered a proﬁtable
combination in the marriage of low-cost, high-distribution, advertising-
intensive magazines with sensational journalism that exposed readers to
important social and economic problems (Chalmers 1974; Filler 1976).
Hence, muckraking journalists like Samuel Hopkins Adams, Ray Stan-
nard Baker, Henry Demarest Lloyd, Upton Sinclair, Lincoln Steﬀens,
Charles Edward Russell, and Ida Tarbell were hired by these periodicals to
write articles exposing unscrupulous business practices, slum urban con-
ditions, and political corruption.
Two major muckraking episodes appear to have been especially critical
in the enactment of the Pure Food and Drugs Act (Anderson 1958; Young
1989; Carpenter 2001). One was the publication in 1906 of Upton Sinclair’s
The Jungle,which exposed unsanitary conditions in Chicago meat-packing
plants and generated public outrage over the quality of meat.6 First pub-
lished as a serial in the muckraking journal Appeal to Reason, Sinclair’s
novel revealed how the large meat packers deceived consumers about the
quality of their products. Sinclair described how “potted chicken” con-
tained no chicken at all; how meat that had turned sour was rubbed with
soda to remove the smell; how moldy sausage rejected from Europe found
its way back into the American market; and how meat was contaminated
on the slaughterhouse ﬂoor. The direct result of Upton Sinclair’s muck-
raking was the 1906 Meat Inspection Act, which signiﬁcantly expanded
the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) inspection of the slaughter-
ing, packing, and canning of meats (Young 1989, pp. 221–50).
The second muckraking episode was a set of articles published in Col-
liers that revealed how patent medicine manufacturers were using their
power over the press to defeat state regulation, but, more important, it
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6. Sinclair’s main objective in writing The Jungle was to provoke outrage over industrial
working conditions of immigrants rather than to reveal deception on the part of the meat
packers regarding product quality. See Young (1989, p. 252).alerted the public to the dangers associated with the use of patent medi-
cines. In a November 4, 1905, article, “The Patent Medicine Conspiracy
against the Freedom of the Press,” Mark Sullivan exposed the inﬂuence of
the patent medicine industry over the press and state eﬀorts to regulate
proprietary remedies. This attack on the nostrum industry was accompa-
nied by a series of articles by Samuel Hopkins Adams, also published in the
autumn of 1905, which pointed to the dangers associated with the indis-
criminate use of patent medicines and the widespread presence of alcohol
and opiates in these drugs. “Gullible America,” wrote Adams, “will spend
this year some seventy-ﬁve million dollars in the purchase of patent medi-
cines. In consideration of this sum it will swallow huge quantities of alco-
hol, an appalling amount of opiates and narcotics, a wide assortment of
varied drugs ranging from powerful and dangerous heart depressants to
insidious liver stimulants; and, far in excess of all other ingredients, undi-
luted fraud” (quoted in Carpenter 2001, p. 269).
The eﬀect of Adams’s muckraking about patent medicines on the pro-
gress of regulatory reform was dramatic. By making the public aware of
the dangers of patent medicines, Adams informed citizens of the possible
public beneﬁts of regulation and therefore provided consumers with a
stronger incentive to lobby actively for food and drug regulation. Congress
was thus inundated with petitions from women’s groups and other con-
sumers throughout the country who demanded regulation of patent medi-
cines. Harvey Wiley and the Bureau of Chemistry supplied chemical analy-
ses of patent medicines to advocate groups who desired more evidence of
their dangers. Adams’s articles were reprinted in the Journal of the Ameri-
can Medical Association and distributed to physicians throughout the
country, who in turn lobbied Congress for regulation (Anderson 1958,
pp. 172–80; Carpenter 2001, pp. 269–70).
Muckraking journalists clearly beneﬁted from the increased sales and
prestige generated by their revelations. However, since the Bureau of
Chemistry was the organization that would be empowered to enforce a fed-
eral food and drug law, it is not surprising that Wiley, more than any other
individual in the federal bureaucracy, tirelessly strove to drum up political
support for a federal food and drug law. For instance, during the early
1900s, Wiley conducted a series of high-proﬁle experiments on USDA em-
ployees (who became popularly known as the “poison-squad”) on the
eﬀects of preservatives on human digestion. Wiley also spoke regularly at
women’s club events about the extent of food and drug adulteration and its
consequences for human health (Carpenter 2001, pp. 263–66). Addition-
ally, a close relationship between Adams and Wiley was forged as the for-
mer gathered materials for his Colliers articles (Young 1989, p. 203). The
alliance between the Bureau of Chemistry and a muckraking press was vi-
tal in forging an enabling political coalition to enact a federal food and
drug law.
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The legislative history of the Pure Food and Drugs Act suggests that
each of the three views of Progressive Era reform contributed to the adop-
tion of federal food and drug regulation. We now turn to an econometric
analysis of congressional voting on two key food and drug bills to provide
an additional empirical test of these three hypotheses. By correlating con-
gressional voting on proposed pure food bills with variables that capture
the inﬂuence of diﬀerent groups, we can illustrate how competing interests
aligned themselves over regulation. Evidence that proxies for key producer
and consumer interests inﬂuenced congressional voting provides support
for the regulatory capture and public interest views of regulation. Addi-
tionally, by comparing votes on food and drug legislation before and after
the muckraking episodes of 1905, we can determine the eﬀect that the
muckraking press and its bureaucratic allies had on the enactment of leg-
islation, which provides a partial test of the third hypothesis for regulation.
Unfortunately, roll call data on congressional votes on the various pure
food and drug bills introduced prior to 1905 are scarce. Bills never reached
a vote, or if they did, no roll call was tabulated. Prior to the February 21,
1906, Senate vote on the bill that became the Pure Food and Drugs Act,
we were only able to ﬁnd one recorded roll call vote of interest to us: the
March 3, 1903, Senate vote on whether or not to consider the Hepburn-
Hansborough bill. This bill was very similar to the 1906 law. It called for
federal regulation of patent drugs not listed in the USP or the NF, and it
required disclosure of ingredients aimed particularly at blended whiskeys
and food manufacturers who used preservatives in their products.
Hence, for our empirical analysis, we examine how diﬀerent interest
groups with a stake in the legislation shaped Senate voting on March 3,
1903, and February 21, 1906.
10.4.1 Econometric Analysis of Senate Voting in 1903
By 1903 the main interests that were engaged in the debate over pure
food and drug regulation were (a) patent medicine manufacturers and or-
ganized medicine, who opposed or supported the Hepburn-Hansborough
bill because of its patent drug regulation; (b) food manufacturers who used
preservatives and glucose, who feared that regulators would target their
items unfairly; (c) straight and blended whiskey manufacturers, who took
opposing sides on the pure food issue; (d) large food manufacturing ﬁrms
engaged in interstate trade, who desired federal regulation in order to re-
duce regulatory compliance costs; and (e) consumer-oriented progressive
reform groups who desired regulation in order to improve the informa-
tional accuracy of product labels. In our regression framework, we include
variables that capture the inﬂuence of these interest groups in each state.
We  also control for party membership and include ﬁrst-dimension D-
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tics for the regression variables are shown in table 10.1.
Column (1) of table 10.2 displays probit regression estimates of the fac-
tors shaping Senate voting on whether or not to consider the 1903 Hep-
burn-Hansborough Bill. The marginal eﬀects of each of the explanatory
variables (evaluated at their means) on Senate voting are shown in the ﬁrst
column of table 10.3. Overall, the regression results are consistent with the
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7. First-dimension D-Nominate scores are widely used to measure a legislator’s ideologi-
cal position on economic issues. D-Nominate scores use Congressional roll call votes as the
basis for the estimation of the spatial (ideological) position of individual legislators. See Poole
and Rosenthal (1997) for a more detailed discussion of how D-Nominate scores are con-
structed.
Table 10.1 Descriptive statistics by state
Variable Mean Standard deviation
Dependent variable
Vote in 1903 (Yes   1) 0.32 0.46
Vote in 1906 (Yes   1) 0.71 0.46
Producer interest variables
Value of patent medicine production per capita ($) 0.67 0.84
Number of physicians per 1,000 in 1900 1.63 0.53
Number of NFMA ﬁrms per 100,000 0.13 0.22
Blended whiskey indicator (0, 1) 0.07 0.25
Straight whiskey indicator (0, 1) 0.09 0.30
Large food manufacturing indicator (0, 1) 0.48 0.50
Consumer interest variables
WCTU dues per 1,000 0.32 0.20
Protestant index 0.24 0.13
Other controls
Republican indicator (in 1903) 0.64 0.48
Republican indicator (in 1905) 0.63 0.48
First dimension D-Nominate score (in 1903) 0.18 0.65
First dimension D-Nominate score (in 1905) 0.21 0.64
Notes and sources: Voting data as well as information on the number of National Food Man-
ufacturers Association (NFMA) ﬁrms in each state are from the Congressional Record (1903,
1906). The value of patent medicine production is in dollars and is taken from U.S. Bureau of
the Census (1905). The number of physicians in 1900 is from U.S. Bureau of the Census
(1900). The large food manufacturing indicator variable is a binary variable that equals 1 in
states that have food manufacturing ﬁrms that produce in excess of $1,000,000 of output and
0 otherwise. Data on food manufacturing production are taken from the U.S. Bureau of the
Census (1905). Blended and straight whiskey indicators are included to measure the inﬂuence
of blended and straight whiskey manufacturers. Blended whiskey and straight whiskey were
produced in diﬀerent states. The blended whiskey indicator is a binary that equals 1 for IL,
IN, and OH and 0 otherwise. The straight whiskey indicator equals 1 for KT, MD, VA, and
PA, and 0 otherwise. First-dimension D-Nominate scores are from VOTEVIEW (http://
voteview.uh.edu). Lower scores indicate a more “liberal” ideology toward economic issues.
The Republican indicator is a binary variable that equals 1 if a senator was Republican and 0
otherwise. Information on party membership was also taken from VOTEVIEW. WCTU dues
per capita and the Protestant index were supplied by Tomas Nonenmacher and Lee Alston.qualitative evidence on the conﬁguration of producer and consumer inter-
est over food and drug regulation. The results also are supportive of the
capture view of regulation but provide more limited support for the public
interest view. Other things being equal, an increase in the size of the patent
medicine industry in a state had a negative and statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the probability that a senator from that state would vote in favor
of the bill. Additionally, an increase in the number of physicians per capita
in a state, a measure of the established medical industry, had a positive but
not signiﬁcant eﬀect on the likelihood a state’s senator would vote in favor
of the bill. In states where blended whiskeys were produced, senators were
less likely to vote for regulation, whereas in states where straight whiskeys
were manufactured senators were more likely to vote for regulation. An in-
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Table 10.2 Probit regression estimates of the factors shaping Senate voting on pure
food and drug regulation in 1903 and 1906
Vote in 1903  Vote in 1906 




Value of patent medicine production per capita –0.73∗∗ –0.20
(0.31) (0.22)
Number of physicians per 1,000 persons in 1900 0.14 0.63∗
(0.39) (0.37)
Number of NFMA ﬁrms per 100,000 persons 0.001 0.09
(0.08) (0.09)
Blended whiskey indicator –6.76∗∗∗ –0.26
(0.43) (0.71)
Straight whiskey indicator 2.23∗∗∗ 1.94∗∗∗
(0.62) (0.71)
Large food manufacturing ﬁrm indicator 0.24 0.96
(0.45) (0.76)
WCTU dues per 1,000 1.30 3.87∗∗∗
(0.95) (1.34)
Protestant index 0.06 0.79
(1.70) (1.95)
Republican indicator 0.51 1.89∗
(0.76) (1.01)
First dimension D-Nominate score –1.38∗∗ –0.83
(0.76) (0.81)
McFadden R2 statistic 0.32 0.30
Likelihood ratio statistic 34.47∗∗∗ 30.37∗∗∗
Notes:Regressions were estimated by a probit model. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard er-
rors are in parentheses.
∗Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
∗∗Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗∗∗Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.crease in the number of food manufacturers in a state who used preserva-
tives (proxied by membership in the National Food Manufacturers Asso-
ciation, or NFMA) had a positive but statistically not signiﬁcant inﬂuence
over the likelihood that a state’s senator would vote in favor of pure food
regulation. Reform interests (proxied by WCTU dues per capita and the
Protestant index) had a positive but statistically insigniﬁcant impact on the
probability that a senator would vote in favor of regulation.8
The coeﬃcient estimates suggest that those producer interests who per-
ceived that regulation would disadvantage their products (patent medicine
makers and blended whiskey producers) opposed regulation, whereas
those who felt that regulation would place them at a competitive advantage
and who played a role in shaping the features of the proposed food and
drug bill (organized medicine, straight whiskey makers) supported it. The
fact that senators representing organized medicine and straight whiskey
interests were more likely to vote for regulation is consistent with the regu-
latory capture argument since both of these groups sought regulation to
disadvantage their lower-cost rivals. While the coeﬃcients on the reform
interest variables are both positive, they are not signiﬁcant, which fur-
nishes weak evidence consistent with the public interest hypothesis. That
these reform interest variables are not signiﬁcant is perhaps unsurprising,
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Table 10.3 Marginal eﬀects of explanatory variables on Senate voting in pure food
and drug regulation in 1903 and 1906
Vote in 1903 Vote in 1906
(1) (2)
Value of patent medicine production per capita –0.14 –0.04
Number of physicians per 1,000 persons in 1900 0.02 –0.04
Number of NFMA ﬁrms per 100,000 persons 0.002 0.13
Blended whiskey indicator –0.13 –0.02
Straight whiskey indicator 0.42 0.39
Large food manufacturing ﬁrm indicator 0.04 0.20
WCTU dues per 1,000 0.25 0.77
Protestant index 0.01 0.16
Republican indicator 0.10 0.38
First dimension D-Nominate score –0.26 –0.16
Note:These values are based on the probit regression estimates reported in table 10.2 and are
calculated at their mean values.
8. Qualitatively similar results were obtained when we used WCTU membership per capita
(instead of WCTU dues per capita) to proxy for reform interests. Additionally, the inclusion
of income per capita does not materially aﬀect the results. The Protestant index measures the
presence of evangelical Protestant groups in each state. This is a reasonable proxy for Pro-
gressive reform interests, since membership in Progressive reform groups was heavily domi-
nated by evangelical Protestants.since consumers, being a large and heterogeneous group, faced high col-
lective action costs (Olson 1965).
Among the political control variables, Republican Party membership
does not play a signiﬁcant role in voting in 1903, but the D-Nominate score
has a signiﬁcant and negative coeﬃcient. More positive D-Nominate
scores indicate a more conservative ideology, and such ideologically moti-
vated senators were more likely to vote against an extension of federal reg-
ulation.
10.4.2 Econometric Analysis of Senate Voting in 1906
We can empirically evaluate the role that muckraking journalism played
in breaking the political deadlock over pure food and drug regulation by ex-
amining the factors that shaped Senate voting in 1906 on the bill that be-
came the Pure Food and Drugs Act. In our analysis of Senate voting in 1903
(the premuckraking period) we found that patent medicine and blended
whiskey interests had a negative and statistically signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the
probability that senators would vote in favor of considering the Hepburn-
Hansborough bill, while reform interests had a positive but statistically in-
signiﬁcant inﬂuence on Senate voting. If muckraking journalism about
patent medicines (which began around October 1905 with the publication
of Samuel Hopkins Adams’s articles in Colliers) provoked widespread con-
sumer interest in favor of regulation, it would have helped to break the po-
litical deadlock over food and drug regulation. Accordingly, in an exami-
nation of Senate voting in the postmuckraking period (after October 1905),
antiregulation producer interests should be less likely to have a negative and
signiﬁcant inﬂuence over Senate voting, and Progressive reform interests
should have a positive and signiﬁcant inﬂuence over Senate voting. Anti-
regulation producer interests should be less signiﬁcant because muckraking
should have made it more costly for politicians representing these groups to
continue to oppose regulation. Reform interests should become signiﬁcant
factors inﬂuencing Senate voting if muckraking, by increasing the perceived
beneﬁts of food and drug regulation, galvanized consumer-oriented groups
to actively pressure politicians to back reform.
Column (2) of table 10.2 presents probit regression estimates of the fac-
tors shaping Senate voting on February 21, 1906; the corresponding mar-
ginal eﬀects are shown in the second column of table 10.3. The coeﬃcients
representing blended whiskey and patent medicine interests are no longer
statistically signiﬁcant, whereas one of the coeﬃcients representing reform
interests (WCTU dues per capita) is positive and signiﬁcant. These post-
muckraking regression results conform to our predictions regarding the
role that muckraking journalism played in breaking the political deadlock
over regulatory reform. By making the issue of food and drug quality emo-
tionally salient, muckraking provoked proconsumer interests to lobby for
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tion business groups to continue to block regulation. In our regression
framework, this is suggested by the fact that one of our proxies for reform
interests is now positive and signiﬁcant, while our proxies for patent med-
icine interests and blended whiskey interests are no longer signiﬁcant.9
The Republican Party variable becomes positive and signiﬁcant in 1906,
reﬂecting President Theodore Roosevelt’s eﬀorts to push his party in Con-
gress to support food and drug regulation in the wake of the publication of
Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle (Anderson 1958, p. 181; Young 1989, p. 254).
Prior to 1905–6, food and drug regulation was not a particularly partisan
issue. The D-Nominate variable no longer has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on Sen-
ate voting. With consumer/voter reaction to muckraking revelations, it be-
came more costly for conservative senators to continue to oppose regula-
tion, making ideology less important.
Overall, these regression results provide evidence supporting each of the
three views of regulation. The straight whiskey variable and the number of
physicians per capita are positive and signiﬁcant, which supports the reg-
ulatory capture hypothesis for regulation. Per capita WCTU dues also
have a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the probability that a senator voted
for regulation. This suggests the importance of organized consumers as a
pro-regulation constituency, which is consistent with the public interest
view. However, the fact that this variable is positive and signiﬁcant in 1906
(postmuckraking) but not in 1903 (premuckraking) suggests that the
muckraking press and its bureaucratic supporters also played an impor-
tant role in generating broad consumer interest in regulation. Hence, taken
together, the evidence is also consistent with the possibility that consumers
were manipulated by a muckraking press.
10.5 Enforcement of the Pure Food and Drugs Act and 
the Long-Term Beneﬁts of Regulation
Given that a mixture of consumer, industry, and bureaucratic interests
were involved in the struggle for federal food and drug regulation, it is
worth investigating the welfare implications of this law. Was federal regu-
lation, once enacted, enforced in a way that beneﬁted speciﬁc industry
groups at the expense of competitors and overall economic eﬃciency? Or
did enforcement of the Pure Food and Drugs Act ultimately produce ben-
eﬁts for consumers and improve the eﬃciency of food and drug markets?
It is diﬃcult to address these issues because few scholars have systemat-
ically analyzed the impact of the Pure Food and Drugs Act on the markets
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9. As before, we ﬁnd that using WCTU membership per capita yields qualitatively similar
results. Additionally, the coeﬃcient estimates are robust to the inclusion of other variables
like income per capita.for food and drugs. Nevertheless, what we know about enforcement of the
law suggests that no view on its own is satisfactory. The evidence on early
enforcement of the act (under the stewardship of Dr. Wiley) suggests that
certain industry groups were favored, which would be consistent with the
regulatory capture view. According to Coppin and High (1999), Wiley at-
tempted to enforce the law in ways that favored straight whiskey makers
and that advantaged manufacturers that did not use preservatives in their
foods. Controversy surrounding Wiley’s enforcement eﬀorts and his resig-
nation from the Bureau of Chemistry in 1911, however, prevented these
groups from obtaining longer-run beneﬁts. While certain industry interests
may have “captured” Wiley, their inﬂuence did not extend to his successors
or to the bureau more generally. Indeed, the personnel of the bureau and
its leadership in the post-Wiley period consisted primarily of professional
bureaucrats, whose interests were not closely aligned with industry. Hence,
because those pro-regulation industry groups who stood to gain most from
regulation did not ultimately control the administering agency, they did
not realize the expected long-term beneﬁts from reduced competition from
substitute products. This outcome weakens the argument in favor of a reg-
ulatory capture view of regulation.
Did consumers then capture the beneﬁts of regulation? The evidence
from the post-Wiley period suggests that although the Bureau of Chem-
istry attempted to enforce the Pure Food and Drugs Act in ways that im-
proved the quality of food and drugs and that reduced asymmetric infor-
mation about food and drug quality, the bureau was not always successful
in achieving these objectives. Because the bureau was small with limited re-
sources, and because the Pure Food and Drugs Act was diﬃcult to enforce
in the courts, the agency relied upon rewards to ﬁrms that complied with
the law. For instance, as one way to promote compliance with the law, it
provided quality certiﬁcation and direct technical advice on how to im-
prove product quality (Law 2004). Eﬀective enforcement, when it hap-
pened, generally yielded socially beneﬁcial outcomes; the bureau’s product
certiﬁcation eﬀorts reduced asymmetric information about the quality of
foodstuﬀs, and as a consequence of its oﬀering technical assistance to
ﬁrms, the quality of many foods improved (Robinson 1990; Young 1992).
These eﬃciency-enhancing outcomes are more consistent with the public
interest view than the regulatory capture view. Certain producers beneﬁted
from these enforcement eﬀorts because they were assisted by the bureau’s
expertise, but there were few restrictions on entry, the classic capture objec-
tive. Nevertheless, it is notable that enforcement successes could only be
achieved when industry also stood to gain from the bureau’s expertise.10
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10. It is also noteworthy that those industry groups that beneﬁted from the bureau’s ex-
pertise were diﬀerent from those groups that anticipated that the Pure Food and Drug Act
would tilt the competitive playing ﬁeld to their advantage. See Law (2004).When industry could not beneﬁt from the bureau’s actions, eﬀective en-
forcement was unlikely since it was diﬃcult for the agency to prosecute
manufacturers in court. For instance, the 1912 Sherley Amendment to the
law required the agency to prove fraud in order to obtain a conviction
(Young 1967, pp. 49–51). As a result, the patent medicine and proprietary
nostrum industry—the industry whose products provoked widespread con-
sumer interest in favor of food and drug regulation in the ﬁrst place—was
never successfully regulated. The ﬂy-by-night nature of much of the nos-
trum industry, combined with the fact that it was extremely diﬃcult for the
bureau to uphold its rulings in court, meant that the agency was generally
ineﬀective in controlling misleading therapeutic claims (Young 1967,
pp. 60–65; Temin 1980, pp. 27–37). Accordingly, while consumers beneﬁted
from enforcement of the Pure Food and Drugs Act, they did not beneﬁt in
the way that they had originally anticipated—through improved informa-
tion about drug quality and safety.
10.6 Conclusion
We explored the origins and eﬀects of the Pure Food and Drugs Act of
1906. Both the narrative and statistical evidence suggest that a nuanced
combination of the three main views of Progressive Era reform (regulatory
capture, public interest, rent seeking by bureaucrats and the press) explains
the adoption of the law. Regulation was sought by speciﬁc producer, con-
sumer, and bureaucratic interests to advance their private goals. Because
their objectives conﬂicted a political stalemate ensued. The muckraking
press eventually galvanized widespread consumer interest in food and drug
regulation and broke the impasse, allowing the law to be ﬁnally enacted.
Even so, without examination of enforcement, it is impossible to know
whether these interest groups obtained the beneﬁts of regulation that they
anticipated. If not, the impact of regulation may fail to conform neatly to
the predictions of any of the three theories of regulation. Because those
producer interests who initially sought regulation for private gain did not
shape the composition of the Bureau of Chemistry and the incentives it
faced, enforcement of the Pure Food and Drugs Act did not dramatically
change competitive conditions to their advantage. Similarly, because those
consumer groups who lobbied for regulation did not anticipate that the
Pure Food and Drugs Act would be so diﬃcult to enforce in the courts, reg-
ulation also failed to signiﬁcantly improve the quality of information about
patent medicines. Hence, the “public interest” was not advanced in the
market that mattered most to these consumers. Perhaps the one group that
obtained lasting beneﬁts from regulation was the Bureau of Chemistry. By
successfully lobbying for legislation, Wiley secured the future of his agency.
This was only a partial success, however, since the bureau’s authority was
very limited and the agency remained relatively small until the late 1930s.
340 Marc T. Law and Gary D. LibecapThe bureau’s enforcement eﬀorts produced some gains for consumers
and certain food producers, but the margins along which these gains were
realized were not anticipated by those interest groups that lobbied actively
on behalf of regulation in the ﬁrst place. Accordingly, the history of the Pure
Food and Drugs Act suggests that understanding the origins and impact of
Progressive Era regulation requires analysis not only of interest group mo-
tivation but also of the organizational and institutional constraints that
limit the beneﬁts that such groups are ultimately able to obtain.
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